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 While the global agenda on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) has a stated focus on 
building women’s agency as well as ensuring women’s protection, implementation efforts 
have generally focused on a vision of women as victims. This narrative overlooks the reality 
that women are frequently agents of political violence, acting as supporters or combatants 
in the majority of contemporary armed groups. By seeing these women and making their 
voices heard in peace processes and post-conflict transitions, we can craft outcomes that 
are more inclusive. The inclusion of these women’s voices may also create more effective 
long-term efforts at conflict prevention.
The international agenda on Women, 
Peace, and Security – as envisioned in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 
1325; 2000) and subsequent resolutions 
– has been described as having three 
pillars: the protection of women, the 
prevention of conflict, and the increased 
participation of women.1 Although on 
paper, each of these principles are treated 
as having equal importance, in practice, 
reviews of global implementation and 
specific national action plans (NAPs) 
developed by UN member states show 
that an emphasis on the protection of 
women has come to overshadow the 
other objectives.2 Indeed, the UN itself 
has acknowledged at the institutional 
level that it has failed to meet 
benchmarks for the inclusion of women 
in peace talks as participants, signatories, 
and mediators.3
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One consequence of the international 
community’s focus on the protection 
of women is that it perpetuates the 
narrative that women’s primary role in 
conflict is that of victim. Indeed, many 
country NAPs on Women, Peace, and 
Security, highlight the need to address 
issues of gender-based violence, sexual 
violence, and/or human trafficking, 
while the most frequently included 
gender clauses in peace agreements are 
provisions to safeguard human rights 
and eliminate discrimination.4 Where the 
inclusion of women is discussed, NAPs 
and peace agreements often encourage 
consultation with or inclusion of 
women from civil society constituencies. 
UN Women’s 2012 report Women’s 
Participation in Peace Negotiations: 
Connections Between Presence and 
Influence called this “one of the most 
sought-after forms of engagement,” 
and included as first among its 
recommendations the development of 
“a standardized protocol that ensures 
engagement of women’s civil society 
groups in formal peace negotiations.”5 
However, this focus on the inclusion of 
civilian women overlooks the widespread 
nature of women’s direct participation 
in contemporary armed conflict. By 
omitting the voices and experiences of 
such women, the outcome of many 
efforts at WPS implementation has been 
incomplete in ways that jeopardise the 
long-term wellbeing of women who are 
veterans of conflict. These exclusionary 
practices also have potentially serious 
consequences for the success of post-
conflict programming and efforts to 
prevent conflict from recurring.
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WOMEN AS AGENTS  
OF VIOLENCE
Research on membership in non-state 
armed groups shows that women 
consistently participate in these 
organisations, and that it is also not 
unusual to find women in combatant and 
leadership roles. A dataset that examines 
women in armed insurgent groups across 
Africa finds that women participated in 
about 45 percent of active insurgencies 
since 1950.6 It also suggests that the 
incorporation of women into these groups 
appears to increase over time, with just 
about half of African insurgencies during 
the 1980s and 1990s containing women.7 
Cross-nationally, similar patterns appear 
to hold.8 Researchers have found women 
active in insurgencies across 60 countries 
and the majority of all such groups active 
since 1990.9
Given this body of research, why do we 
see comparatively little focus on insurgent 
women in the WPS agenda? One issue 
may be a lack of visibility among women 
in these groups. While women are active 
in the majority of insurgencies, they 
tend to be concentrated in roles away 
from combat, rendering them less visible 
and (at times) giving them less status in 
the organisation. It has been estimated 
that women act as combatants in only 
one-third of insurgencies, while they hold 
leadership positions in just about one-
quarter of groups active since the end of 
the Cold War.10 In national militaries as 
well as rebel groups, being a combatant 
confers a notion of elite status.11 Those 
who engage in (or are trained to engage 
in) armed combat command more 
respect and often find easier paths to 
leadership positions – like a seat at the 
table in peace accords. 
The concentration of women in 
roles away from the actual fighting 
can create confusion over who is a 
participant or member in an armed 
group. Many women serve roles similar 
to that of historical “camp followers”. 
Camp followers serve a number of 
crucially important roles for military 
organisations, including provisioning, 
cooking, laundering, and nursing.12 In 
the past, such women were tolerated 
even in national militaries; though they 
were usually deprived of certain benefits 
reserved for male soldiers – eg, ranks, 
uniforms, or a salary. By depriving 
women of these signifiers, military 
commanders were able to purge them 
easily when they felt that the camp 
follower’s presence was undermining 
group cohesion or efficiency.13
A similar pattern is evident in some 
rebel groups. In Angola, Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) reports that many 
women – particularly wives, widows, 
and partners of male combatants – 
played a supporting role in the National 
Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola’s (UNITA’s) armed efforts. Several 
women interviewed by HRW in 2003 
reported that they even were awarded 
official ranks within the organisation 
for administrative work, for acting 
as messengers, carrying supplies, or 
helping with organisational logistics. 
However, these women found themselves 
effectively excluded from disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) 
programming, which was only offered 
to personnel who were combatants – a 
distinction almost exclusively available to 
men in the UNITA ranks.14 In the military 
wing of Angola’s Front for the Liberation 
of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), women 
played roles substantially similar to those 
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of women in the UNITA. Yet, while 
women reported preparing food for male 
combatants, organising schools in rebel-
held areas, and recruiting other women 
to support the organisation, they do 
not appear to have received any formal 
recognition for these efforts.15 
In some cases, there are documented 
instances of insurgent groups actively 
attempting to conceal the inclusion of 
women within their ranks. In the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), for 
example, women were consciously moved 
from combatant positions to less visible 
roles over the course of the conflict, in 
part because the organisation wanted 
them to reproduce rather than fight.16 
Some women in Sierra Leone’s RUF 
likewise reported that commanders took 
guns away from them after the conflict, 
rendering them unable to participate in 
official DDR registries – which required 
demobilising combatants to surrender a 
firearm.17 The prevalent use of girl soldiers 
in some conflicts further complicates 
matters. Where organisational leadership 
fears exposure, stigma, or possible 
prosecution due to the use of child 
soldiers, there is a strong incentive to 
make the use of both boy and girl soldiers 
less visible. As an example, while the use 
of male child soldiers was widespread 
within armed groups in Sierra Leone, girl 
soldiers commonly reported playing less 
visible roles away from open combat – 
such as cooking, sex work, and looting 
after a battle. As a result, these girls 
were often labeled as “unaccompanied 
children” and not “child soldiers” during 
the DDR phase – a misrepresentation 
that had both material and psychological 
effects for young women transitioning 
out of conflict.18
DISARMING WOMEN, 
STRENGTHENING PEACE 
By understanding the extent to which 
women contribute to political violence – 
as well as the roles that they play – we 
can potentially shape more inclusive as 
well as more effective peace agreements 
and post-conflict programming. It is 
worth considering that the participation 
of women (and girls) in DDR programmes 
has been historically low, even when we 
know that women formed a substantial 
part of the non-state armed groups 
involved in fighting. 
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Research based on discussions with 
female combatants has revealed a few 
common reasons why these women are 
often excluded from aid efforts after 
a conflict. First, where disarmament 
is conceptualised as a pre-requisite 
for demobilisation and reintegration 
activities, women are placed at a 
disadvantage. The notion of disarmament 
often presumes the existence and use of 
small arms, and reinforces a narrow idea 
of who is a combatant. Interviews with 
women in armed groups in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia indicate that many women 
either shared guns with other fighters, 
or were asked by commanders to 
surrender their arms to them before the 
war’s end.19 Their inability to participate 
in disarmament by extension precludes 
women from efforts at demobilisation 
and reintegration. Cases like these 
indicate the importance of moving 
beyond the combatant-noncombatant 
dichotomy that defines many DDR 
programmes. These traditional labels 
may not do justice to the complexities of 
armed groups that include large numbers 
of women and girl soldiers.
Another lesson to be learned from 
women in rebel groups is that shame 
and fear are barriers that DDR initiatives 
must work to overcome. Research has 
repeatedly shown that women and 
girls walk away from post-conflict 
programming because they are afraid 
of the social exclusion that comes with 
being identified publicly as a member of 
an insurgency.20 At the same time, factors 
that make women’s contributions less 
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visible in wartime can also make it easier 
for them to fade into the background 
when a conflict is over. If women’s 
fear of social rejection outweighs the 
perceived benefits of their participation 
in a DDR programme, they are likely to 
choose what appears to be the easier 
path. This choice is compounded by the 
fact that women often perceive little 
potential benefit from participating in 
post-conflict initiatives like job training. 
Such programmes, when aimed at 
women, are often focused on preparing 
them for low-wage, low-prestige jobs 
like hairdressing, seamstressing, soap-
making, or beekeeping.21 If the result 
of these programmes is to prepare 
women for jobs that won’t meaningfully 
improve their standard of living (and 
which may not be in demand at all in 
their communities), why run the risks 
associated with enrolling? This is a 
question policymakers need to consider, 
although the solutions will likely 
vary from one conflict to the next. In 
particular, efforts aimed at overcoming 
social stigma will likely need to be highly 
contextualised and should consider the 
intersectional effects of gender when 
combined with age, race/ethnicity, 
religion, etc.
A final takeaway point is that 
programmes that want to be gender-
inclusive will have greater impact when 
women are involved in the planning 
process. This hearkens back to one of the 
original – albeit often overlooked – aims 
of UNSCR 1325: inclusion of women as 
agents. While still ongoing, the peace 
process in Colombia has offered some 
intriguing outcomes that demonstrate 
the value of including female members 
of rebel groups in a negotiation. The 
Havana Peace Talks, which culminated 
in a peace agreement between the 
Colombian government and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) in 2016, were noteworthy in 
that the negotiations included a Gender 
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Subcommission. This subcommission was 
charged with assessing the gendered 
impact of the final agreement, and 
its membership included women 
representing both the FARC and the 
national government, while also receiving 
the input and advice of thousands of 
experts and victims of the conflict. The 
Executive Director of UN Women and the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Sexual Violence in Conflict 
called the Gender Subcommission “a 
unique mechanism in the history of 
conflict resolution.”22
There is initial evidence that the existence 
of this mechanism – and, by extension, 
the involvement of rebel women in the 
peace process – has produced a more 
inclusive outcome than past settlements. 
According to reports issued in spring 
of 2017, 32 percent of FARC cadres 
arriving at designated demobilisation 
zones are women.23 That figure reflects 
a gender ratio that roughly corresponds 
to the overall FARC membership, which 
is generally believed to be 30-40 percent 
women.24 If accurate, the reported 
participation rate is fairly remarkable 
because it represents a much higher level 
of female engagement than what has 
been observed in DDR processes following 
other conflicts. It is, additionally, a notably 
higher participation rate than what the 
government of Colombia achieved with 
its own defection and demobilisation 
programmes prior to Havana. Statistics 
from the Colombian Agency for 
Reintegration (ACR) suggest that in 10 
years of demobilisation programming 
from 2003-2012, only about 20 
percent of participants from the FARC 
and 11 percent of participants overall 
were women.25 Thus, there is a strong 
suggestion that female cadres are more 
willing to participate in a programme 
that they know their peers helped to 
design. Indeed, some DDR programming 
currently being implemented in Colombia 
is also being led or facilitated by FARC 
members. In the spring of 2017, a small 
group of FARC affiliates participated in a 
“train the trainer” programme aimed at 
giving them the technical and logistical 
skills to participate in the campaign to 
de-mine conflict-affected areas of the 
country. The initial graduates of this 
workshop are currently recruiting other 
demobilising combatants to work for the 
campaign, thereby securing paid, skilled 
employment for those individuals for 
the duration of the de-mining process.26 
Two women participated in the pilot 
phase of the de-mining project, and they 
are currently training other ex-militant 
women to take part.27 According to the 
FARC’s social media channels, training in 
a variety of other job skills has been made 
available to both men and women in the 
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demobilisation camps, including training 
in systems management and Microsoft 
Office programs.28 Again, this represents 
a notable departure from previous DDR 
efforts such as the one in Sierra Leone, 
where training in computer/technical skills 
was only offered to men.29
FARC women involved in the Havana 
peace talks had an important voice in 
creating a gender-inclusive DDR effort. 
More broadly, though, these women also 
had the opportunity to provide input into 
matters of land rights, victim’s rights, 
crime, and other matters that impact the 
female population of Colombia beyond 
the FARC’s ranks. This focus on social 
issues fits with research that tells us that 
women who join armed insurgencies 
often do so in response to some form of 
collective deprivation, like widespread 
poverty, perceived abuses against their 
ethnic or religious group, or limitations 
on civil and political rights.30 Again, 
it will take time to see the full impact 
of FARC women’s engagement in the 
peace process, but initial signs suggest 
that this agreement could be a key case 
in illustrating the value of including not 
just women, but women from all sides 
of a conflict, in peace processes. Should 
the international community truly be 
concerned with implementing all three 
pillars of the Women, Peace, and Security 
Agenda, they would do well to take note.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
 
Keeping in mind the international community’s commitment to promote the participation 
of women in peace processes, the architects of DDR programmes should be cognisant of 
the particular needs of women who are demobilising from armed groups. These key points 
should be considered.
1. “Disarmament” should 
be viewed through a 
gendered lens 
While disarmament is an important 
goal in post-conflict processes, the 
assumption that all combatants will 
have small arms to surrender has 
been problematic. The experience of 
women in contemporary insurgent 
groups indicates that they are placed 
at a disadvantage in areas where the 
surrender of weapons is required 
for entry into demobilisation and 
reintegration programming.
2. Fear and shame are 
powerful barriers to 
women’s inclusion in  
DDR programmes
Women and girls demobilising from 
rebel groups often face stigma or social 
exclusion. To understand and overcome 
these barriers, programmes need to 
be contextualised and mindful of the 
intersectional concerns of gender, 
ethnicity, religion, age, etc. At the same 
time, adding value to programming 
aimed at women can impact the cost-
benefit calculus faced by potential 
participants. This can be accomplished 
by, for example, creating job-training 
programmes aimed at preparing women 
for skilled professions.
3. Give women from 
combatant groups a  
voice in designing  
post-conflict initiatives
By making women stakeholders in 
the DDR process, governments and 
international organisations send a 
powerful signal that they value the 
inclusion of women. In particular, by 
including female ex-combatants in 
“train the trainer” programmes like 
those implemented in Colombia, 
policymakers can create a beneficial 
cycle where women are positioned to 
bring other women into the process. 
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